In dis rubriek vertaal ich 'n filesofische passaag die ich sjwan ving nao mien moojertaal, 't Limbörgs. Vandaag inkele heidense wäörd van de zögenömde "pre-Socraat" Heraclitös, ouwe wäörd die euvergewäjd zeen van eeuwe veurdat Ozze Leeven Jer gebore waor. De selectie is de miene. Ich ging bie michzelf op onderzeuk. 't Is alle luuj gegeve zichzelf te kènne en versjtändig te zeen. Hybris bewärt geblös te weure nog väöl mjer es 'ne oetsjloonde brand. De minsje wach, es zie sjterve, wat zie neet verwachte en aoch neet geluive. Natuur - zö zaet Heraclitös - plaeg zich verborge te houwe. Veur de god is alles sjwan, good en rechvaardig, mèr de minsje goon d'rvan oet dat 't eine onrechvaardig, 't andere rechvaardig is. De weeg op en neer is ein en dezelfde. Kränkte maak gezondheid prettig en good, hoonger verzaodiging, vermeuidheid oetröste. Zie höbbe d'r gein begrip van, wie 't aafzonderende mit zichzelf insjtömp: 'n ömmer terrukkjerrende härm...
The Ongoing Soft Revolution from Vol. 30, No. 2, Winter 2004 of Critical Inquiry By Slavoj Zizek In his admirable "The Pedagogy of Philosophy," Jean-Jacques Lecercle described the scene of a yuppie on the Paris underground reading Deleuze and Guattari's What Is Philosophy? The incongruity of the scene induces a smile–after all, this is a book explicitly written against yuppies… Your smile turns into a grin as you imagine that this enlightenment-seeking yuppie bought the book because of its title… Already you see the puzzled look on the yuppie's face, as he reads page after page of vintage Deleuze. What, however, if there is no puzzled look, but enthusiasm, when the yuppie reads about impersonal imitation of affects, about the communication of affective intensities beneath the level of meaning ("Yes, this is how I design my publicities!"), or when he reads about exploding the limits of self-contained subjectivity and directly coupling man to a machine (...
"If you're trying to choose between free will and determinism you're so mired in metaphysical confusion that it is, frankly, comical. No-one is going to win in a free will/determinism debate, because the two concepts are mutually complicit and mutually confused, and they're both symptoms of a pre-critical understanding of time. […] Because what's at stake here, ultimately, is extremely traditional within modernity, it's just Kantian. Which is to say: Time can not be conceived of as an object in time. If you're trying to put time in time, then you're engaged in a hopeless metaphysical undertaking. The time of the future doesn't come from the time of the past… The future does not come out of the past; that is the mechanical, common-sensical error which is so tempting for everyone to make. The past, the present and the future, that structure of time comes out of time; it is transcendental. It doesn't come out of any particular part of time… […] Now...
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